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The Maguindanao Massacre, 
Critical Elections and Armed Conflict 
in the Philippines by Eva-Lotta Hedman
The Maguindanao Massacre has sent shock waves 
through the Philippines and beyond. A convoy of 
cars was caught in an armed ambush on Monday 
23 November, leaving at least 57 persons dead, 
with mutilated bodies and crushed vehicles found 
buried in large pits. The convoy was destined for the 
Commission of Elections office in Shariff Aguak town, 
Magindanao Province in the Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The purpose was to file 
local vice mayor Esmael Mangudadatu’s certificate of 
candidacy to run for the governorship of Maguindanao 
province in the May 2010 Philippine elections. Among 
the victims of the massacre were at least 30 journalists, 
more than 20 women, including the wife and two sisters 
of Mangudadatu.
As news of the massacre spread quickly, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon and the U.S. Embassy in Manila called 
upon President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to ensure that 
those responsible for the attack be brought to swift justice. 
At this writing, a local mayor and scion of the powerful 
Ampatuan family, Andal Ampatuan Jr., has been charged 
with 25 counts of murder and remains in police custody in 
a Manila prison. A number of other people have also been 
recommended to face murder charges, including at least 
six other Ampatuans (the provincial governor, the ARMM 
governer, another mayor, a vice mayor, and the head of 
so-called ‘police auxiliary forces’). In the aftermath of the 
massacre, Maguindanao was first placed under a state 
of emergency, and the entire locally appointed police force 
of more than 1,000 men dismissed. Subsequently, Arroyo 
has moved to declare martial law in the province, thus 
effectively authorizing thousands of government troops to 
make arrests without court warrants and otherwise crack 
down on the Ampatuan clan and its private army of so-called 
‘auxiliary’ police forces or ‘civilian volunteer organizations.’
The targeting of women and media representatives in such 
large numbers and brutal manners during broad daylight, 
possibly resulting in more journalists killed in a single attack 
than anywhere else in the world, was not merely shocking. 
It was also the fatal outcome of a deliberate strategy 
for launching an electoral challenge against the grip on 
power exercised by the Ampatuans through elective and 
appointive government positions, as well as through local 
police and private armies, in Maguindanao, and beyond 
(the ARMM governor is also an Ampatuan as of 2005). That 
is, Mangudadatu’s convoy itself represented an attempt 
at expanding the repertoire of oppositional politics in the 
forbidding context that is contemporary Maguindanao. 
While the placing of women and journalists in harm’s way 
failed to deter the fatal attack, the swift public reaction to 
the massacre is nonetheless testimony to the power of the 
individual courage and collective action demonstrated by 
those who joined in this convoy.
The particular circumstances and suspected culprits behind 
this massacre have attracted considerable attention, in the 
Philippines and elsewhere. While details and evidence have 
yet to be heard in a court of law, the deeper causes and 
consequences of this massacre can be gleaned from analyzing 
the wider political context and dynamics – in Maguindanao, 
in Muslim Mindanao, and elsewhere in the Philippines. There 
are at least three important patterns to consider in this regard: 
i) the practice of election-related violence; ii) the integration 
of the Muslim minority population; and iii) the emergence of 
zones of impunity in the southern provinces of the Philippines.
 
Many observers have noted that election-related violence 
remains a familiar and widespread practice not merely in 
southern Philippines but in many other parts of the country 
as well. In recent memory, for example, a reported 186 
candidates and supporters were killed in election-related 
violence across the country in 2004, and another 126 in 
the 2007 elections. More generally, ‘guns, goons, and gold’ 
have long been a mainstay of Philippine electoral politics, as 
have national citizens’ movements that seek to safeguard 
‘free and fair’ elections against violence, vote-buying and 
electoral fraud. 
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More easily overlooked, however, is a pattern of violence 
during periods when a (long-term) incumbent president is – or 
should be – a lame duck and the anticipated realignment of 
national politics spells a concomitant shift in (entrenched) local 
structures of power. In view of the firm grip on local power 
by the Ampatuans in Maguindanao since 2001, and their 
close association with Arroyo during a long presidency which 
is now drawing to a close, the May 2010 elections present 
precisely such a moment of (would be) change and turnover 
in the wider context of a deeply entrenched authoritarian 
enclave, or so-called ‘warlord bailiwick.’ Having played a 
critical role in delivering a hefty chunk of the ‘Mindanao vote’ 
to Arroyo’s ruling party in the 2004 elections, the Ampatuans 
have since consolidated their grip on local power and held a 
total of 16 positions to political office in Mindanao, including 
two governorships, at the time of the massacre. Here, the – 
notoriously violent – elections of 1971, when then president 
Ferdinand Marcos had been in power for six years and was 
expected to leave office in 1973, suggests useful insights 
and sobering lessons for the prospects and dynamics of the 
upcoming Philippine elections to be held in May 2010. 
The problematic pattern of integration of the Muslim minority 
population is another important but often misunderstood 
backdrop to the conflict in the southern Philippines. The 
early 1970s witnessed armed separatist mobilization for 
an independent Moro homeland under the rubric of the 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). By the mid-1970s, 
nearly 75% of the troops of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines had been deployed to Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago, with violent clashes leading to an estimated 
50,000 casualties and the forced displacement of hundreds 
of thousands of residents. With a peace accord signed 
in 1976, live-and-let-live arrangements emerged in the 
southern Philippines, allowing armed Muslim groups 
to enjoy considerable local power. The resumption of 
democratic elections in the mid-late 1980s, and the creation 
of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the 
1990s facilitated this pattern of accommodation. 
However, from 2000, and deepening with the onset of 
the ‘Global War On Terrorism’ in late 2001, the southern 
Philippines saw large-scale government military campaigns 
in the name of ‘counter-terrorism’, causing casualties, 
destruction, and forced displacement on a scale not seen 
since the early-mid 1970s. A ‘Total War’ begun in 2000 
dramatically reduced the effective control enjoyed by the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) over Muslim areas of 
central Mindanao. A later wave of military operations in 
the islands of the Sulu Archipelago was waged against the 
small shadowy Islamist terrorist network known as the Abu 
Sayyaf Group.
From 2006 up through mid-2008, however, a new pattern 
of accommodation had emerged between the Philippine 
government and the MILF, with informal understandings 
accompanied by formal diplomatic negotiations, leading 
to a Memorandum of Understanding in early-mid 2008. 
This lull in the fighting coincided, not accidentally, with the 
2007 mid-term elections. But the proposed accord was 
opposed by many Christian interests in Mindanao and by 
elements within the MILF as well. Tensions increased, and 
both sides began to rearm and remobilize their forces. 
By mid-2008, armed skirmishes were reported in mixed 
Muslim/Christian areas of central Mindanao, with MILF 
attacks on villages provoking a large-scale AFP military 
campaign that has continued, on and off, well into 2009. 
Meanwhile, kidnappings by the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan 
and Sulu sparked renewed counter-terrorism operations 
by Philippine government forces in the Sulu Archipelago. 
In both central Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the 
resurgence of armed conflict has led to the displacement 
of hundreds of thousands of residents, only a minority of 
whom have found refuge in the government’s evacuation 
centres. February and March 2009 saw renewed fighting 
and large-scale flight in some areas, and new mlitary 
operations were launched in April, prompting further large-
scale displacement, especially in Maguindanao. Despite 
the July 2009 ceasefire and the December resumption of 
peace talks between the Philippine government and MILF, 
conflict, violence and displacement continue to loom large 
on the horizon of Muslim Mindanao in the absence of a 
political solution. 
Localised in the context of southern Philippines, the Global 
War On Terrorism has thus lent added momentum to the 
emergence of zones of impunity in parts of Mindanao. 
As the heartland of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and a key theatre of armed conflict, the province of 
Maguindanao presents a political terrain where extrajudicial 
killings have continued to feature prominently among 
civilian casualties. Indeed, the absence of any clearly 
demarcated zones between military and civilian areas has 
remained the norm in Maguindanao and other parts of 
Mindanao affected by protracted conflict and cycles of 
militarised violence. What is at times referred to as clan-
based violence, or rido, pitting rivaling families and their 
supporters against each other in their competition for 
local political power and resources, is perhaps the most 
notorious manifestation of such impunity, as noted in a 
recent study conducted by researchers at Mindanao State 
University in Marawi. 
As the stalled peace talks between the Philippine 
government and the MILF have resumed in Kuala Lumpur 
on 8-9 December, the shock waves from the Maguindanao 
Massacre continue to reverberate. Perhaps the calls for 
swift justice and the moves to prevent further bloodshed 
in the aftermath of the massacre will also add urgency 
and momentum to end the injustices and violence visited 
upon the thousands of Filipinos caught in the crossfire 
of armed conflict and military campaigns in southern 
Philippines. It can only be hoped that the Arroyo 
administration’s declaration of martial law and ongoing 
military operations against the Ampatuans and their 
alleged 4,000 strong private army in Maguindanao 
does not portend yet another chapter in Philippine 
history in which conflict in Mindanao and corruption in 
Manila converge at great expense to Filipinos of all faiths. 
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